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Regulating Payday Lenders in Canada: Drawing
on American Lessons
Stephanie Ben-lshai*
The regulation ofpayday loans holds the potential ofextending the benefits ofregulating
overindebtness, currently provided via bankruptcy legislation to the middle-class, to
lower income debtors. This potential needs to be balanced against lower income debtors'
need for credit and the corresponding benefits resulting from access to credit provided
by alternative credit markets, such as the payday lending market. Unlike the United
States, where payday lenders have more locations than Starbucks and McDonalds
combined, and payday lending regulation is up there with Vampire Weekend and the
Tipping Point as an attention grabbing pop-culture reference, payday lending is relatively new, underdeveloped and unregulated in Canada. Over the last year, in the wake
of a recent amendment to the Canadian Criminal Code, that would see payday lenders
exempted from the 60 per cent criminal rate of interest in provinces where payday
lenders are provincially regulated, Canadian provinces have began to regulate and put
forth regulatory proposals for a previously unregulated area. This exercise has been
attempted in the context of limited recent published domestic academic analysis of the
payday lending industry, borrowers and regulatory options. Accordingly, this article
sets out to fill this void. The article draws on the American experience with payday
lending and payday lending regulation, and also a first-hand experience of attempting
to obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario, to evaluate the current provincial reform
efforts.

La reglementation des prets sur salaire poursuit Les memes objectifs que Les regles sur
le surendettement actuellement recherches par Les Lois sur la faillite, a l'egard des
debiteurs de la classe moyenne et afaible revenu. Les besoins de credit des debiteurs a
faible revenu et Les benefices qu 'ils tirent de l'acces au credit foumi par Les marches du
credit altematif tel que le marche du pret sur salaire, doivent s 'equilibrer. Aux EtatsUnis, Les preteurs sur salaire comptent plus de succursales que Starbucks et McDonald
reunis et la reglementation entourant ces prets sur salaire se situe au meme niveau que

*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful
for comments from David Clarke and Dave Dupuis of the Office of Consumer Affairs,
Tony Duggan, Benjamin Geva, Stephen Lubben, Jacob Ziegel, and for the input received
at a presentation of an earlier form of this article to the Faculty Colloquium Workshop at
Seton Hall Law School. The splendid research assistance provided by Virginia Torrie,
Catherine Nowak, and Zohar Levy is gratefully acknowledged. Research for this article is
current to April 8, 2008. All errors are my own.
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/es Vampire Weelund et les Tipping Point. manifestation type de la culture populaire;
au Canada, /es prits sur sa/aire onl fail leur apparition recemment, ne sont pas encore
tres dlveloppls ni tres encadrls. Ala suited'une modification apportie au Code criminel
canadien permettant aux priteurs sur salaire d ·i tre dispenses du taux d 'intlrit criminel
de (j() % dans /es provinces ou /es prits sur salaire sont rig is par des lois provinciales.
/es provinces canadiennes ont commend a rlglementer un domaine qui ne l'ltait pas
auparavant, a la /umiere d 'un nombre restreint d' analyses domestiques sur la question.
Cet article a ltl lcrit dans le but de comb/er un vide. JI rlfere aI'experience amlricaine
dans le domaine des prets sur sa/aire ainsi qu 'a une experience acquise sur place /ors
d'une tentative pour obtenir un prit sur salaire aToronto. en Ontario.
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Payday loans are a relatively new phenomenon in Canada. They
are typically short-term, single-payment loans: the lender agrees to lend
the debtor a certain amount of money, in return for the promise of
repayment (usually on a cheque from the debtor, post-dated to the date
of his or her next paycheque) and certain fees. Payday lending has been
vilified in recent media coverage of subprime or fringe lending. Often
payday lending is described as "predatory." Three key arguments are
made in support of the "predatory" label: payday lenders charge too
much money; payday lenders target the poor; and payday lenders lie to
customers (or omit information). At the same time, payday lending, like
other forms of fringe lending in the past, plays a role in servicing and
giving access to credit to an otherwise neglected segment of the market:
minority and disenfranchised groups.
In the wake of a recent amendment to the federal Criminal Code
that would see payday lenders exempted from the 60 per cent criminal
rate of interest in provinces where payday lenders are provincially regulated, Canadian provinces have begun to regulate and put forth regulatory proposals for a previously unregulated area. This exercise has
been attempted in the context of limited recent published domestic
academic analysis of the payday lending industry, borrowers and regulatory options. Accordingly, this article sets out to fill this void by
drawing on the American experience with payday lending and payday
lending regulation, and also a first-hand experience of attempting to
obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario. First an introduction to the
"payday lending debate" is provided. Second, the business model for
payday lenders operating in Canada is set out. Third, the evolving Canadian regulatory scheme is outlined. The fourth section of the article
documents six attempts to obtain loans from payday lenders in Toronto,
Ontario. The fifth section of the article provides an analysis of the
American tools used for regulating payday lenders. The sixth section of
the article evaluates the evolving Canadian regulatory scheme in light
of lessons drawn from the use of the various regulatory tools in the
United States and the visits to Canadian payday lenders. Part seven
concludes with reflections on two possible directions for future research:
the role of Canadian corporate and securities law and the corporate social
responsibility movement in facilitating a change in the practices of
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payday lenders and the potential of American Community Reinvestment
Act style legislation in Canada.

1. AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYDAY LENDING
One of the most common fonns of attack leveled against payday
lenders begins with the author recounting the story of a borrower, usually
a woman of modest means, often of a minority group, who takes out a
payday loan for a small amount to make ends meet and ends up paying
thousands of dollars in fees without ever paying off the principal. 1 The
interest charged by payday lenders is generally over 400 per cent annual
percentage rate (APR),2 and other fees including rollover or extension
fees can further increase the cost of a loan. Given that in Canada, the
federal criminal usury rate is 60 per cent, the rates charged even by
compliant payday lenders are far above what mainstream credit providers charge. Because the rate of interest charged is so high, the payday
lending transaction has been described as "one-sided," and not extending
any real benefit to payday loan consumers.3 Further, payday lenders
structure their loans in such a way as to be most profitable to them. For
example, the date on which the loan is due is usually the day before the
borrower's paycheque arrives, so lenders are able to charge additional
fees for repayment after the due date.4
Even if these fees and interest were reasonable for a single transaction, the fact that the majority of payday lenders are repeat customers
See for example: Patricia Turner ended up paying $840 in extension fees for a $300 loan
which she was not able to pay down in Charles Bruch, 'Taking the Pay Out of Payday
Loans: Putting an End 10 the Usurious and U nconscionablc Interest Rates Charged by Payday
Lenders" (2001) 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257; Sandra Harris s experience with payday lenders
resulted in her car being repossessed and wages garnered in Michael Bertics. "Fixing Payday
Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank lnvohement" (2005) 9 N.C. Banking lnst. 133;
most newspaper articles on payday lenders also start with a similar story, like Margaret
Smith in "Caught in the Loan Trap: Paying it Back Can Become a Vicious Circle" (19 June
2004) Toronto Star.
2 Creola Johnson, "Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?" (2002) 87 Minn.
L. Rev. I at 27; Kathleen E. Keest & El.izabeth Renuart, The Cost ofCredil: Regulation and
Legal Challenges, 2nd ed. (Boston: National Consumer Law Center, 2000) at 297; Aaron
Huckstep, "Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean Outrageous Profitsr'
(2006) 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 203 at 208; in Canada the situation is similar, as
reflected in Protecting Canadians· Interest: Reining in the Payday Lending Industry
(ACORN Canada: Vancouver, 2004) at I ["ACORN Report"].
3 Bruch. supra, n. I at 1279.
•ACORN Report, supra, n. 2 at 10.
1
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means that many borrowers are trapped in the scheme for the long hauf.S
Instead of encouraging customers to pay off their debt, payday lenders
extend loans (for a hefty fee) or allow borrowers to take out new loans
to repay the old ones;6 many payday lenders encourage customers to
take out multiple loans at the same time.7 In fact. the very nature of the
payday loan and its short duration (typically two weeks), means that
rolling over loans is often inevitable for payday borrowers.8 This rollover
feature can cause consumers to "accumulate an unmanageable cycle of
debt.''9
As two American commentators argue, payday lenders "feed off
poverty and financial exclusion."1°For example, the average American
payday loan customer is likely to be a member of a minority group from
an inner city neighborhood. 11 Some sources (often payday lenders or
organizations representing them) paint a more tlattering picture of payday borrowers, suggesting that payday customers make an average salary
of around $35,000, a third of them own their homes, and that they have
been in their jobs and homes for around 4 years. 12 However, this description of the demographic is discredited by most academics, as numbers
like that are sometimes reflective of county-wide averages rather than
actual payday loan customers. 13
Often, payday loan customers have low fixed incomes.•• Their
income leaves little room for coping with emergencies or additional
expenses. The target customers for payday lenders rarely have the sur• Bruch , supra , n. I at 1280; Huckstep, supra, n. 2 at 208.
• Bruch, supra , n. I at 128 1.
' Bertics, supra, n. 1 at 138-9.
a Ibid .. at 138.
9 Carmen Butler & Niloufar Park, "M ayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility
Save Payday Lcndersr' (2005) 3 Rutgers J.L. & Urb. Pol'y 119 at 122.
10
H. Palmer, Profiting from Poverty: Why Debt is Big Business in Britain ( New Economics
Foundation: Londo n, 2002).
11 Laurie Burlingame, ~A Pro-Consumer Approac h to Predatory Lending: Enhanced Protcc·
tion Through Federal Legislation and Ne w Approaches to Education" (2006) 60 Cons umer
Fin. L .Q . Rep. 460 at 462; Ly nn Drysdale & Kathleen Keest, "'The Two-Tiered Cons umer
Financial Services Marl<etplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challe nge to Current
Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society" (2000) 51 S.C. L. Rev . 589
12
IJ
1
•

at 591.
Drysdale &. Keest, ibid.. at 627.
Ibid.. at 629.
tl>Uf.. at 630, 631-32; Kurt Eggert "Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self·
Li mitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending" (2003) 36 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 693.
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plus in their budget they would need to pay back the interest fees charged
by the lenders - if they did, they would not be turning to payday lenders
in the first place. 15
One of the other accusations most often levied against payday
lenders is that they prevent customers from making educated choices or
shopping around because they are not clear about the fees they charge.
Many payday lenders hide basic infonnation about their loans from
customers. 16 Payday lenders have also been known to avoid disclosure
of infonnation like interest rates or finance charges until right before the
agreement is to be signed. 17 According to one study, payday lenders in
Ohio do not typically disclose the triple digit interest rates they charge
until after the payday loan agreement is signed. 18 Other American payday
loan providers refused to respond to an oral request from a borrower
who wanted to know the APR of their loan. 19 In another survey, only 37
per cent of payday lenders gave an "even marginally accurate APR"
when a telephone inquiry was made about the cost of credit. 20
The misleading advertising is even more egregious in situations
where there is a legitimately better option - for example, in the context
of the American military, where active duty personnel can receive interest-free emergency Joans but still tum to payday lenders because of
their "powerful marketing campaigns." 21
Even for borrowers who are somewhat aware that there are statutory
limits on interest that can be charged (in some American states, and in
Canada until the amendments to s. 347 of the Criminal Code), payday
lenders can still convince them to borrow without violating their rights
since they will often charge very little "interest" and collect the remainder of their money as various types of fees. 22 However, where the issue
" Bruch, supra, n. I at 1280.
•• Benics. supra, n. I at 139 citing John son, supra, n. 2 at 32; Butler & Park, supra, n. 9 at
121.
17 Christophtt L Peterson, ''Truth, Understanding, and High Cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act" (2003) SS Fla. L. Rev. 807 at 898.
11 Johnson, supra, n. 2 at 32.
19
Jean Ann Fox & Edmund Mierzwinski, "Rent-A-Bank: How Banks Help Payday Lenders
Evade State Consumer Protections," the 200 I Payday Lender Survey and Repon, (CFA &
State Public Interest Re~arch Groups), o nl ine: < http:llwww.uspirg.org> at 13.
20 Bruch, supra, n. I at 1284.
2 1 Drysdale & Keest. supra. n. 11 at 630-1 .
22 ACORN repon, supra, n. 2 at 11 ; Bruch, supra, n. I at 1276.

REGULATING PAYDAY LENDERS IN CANADA

329

has been litigated, couns have recognized that these fees are interest,
and generally classified them as such when deciding cases. 23

There remains an upside to payday lending. Consider the role that
payday lending plays in servicing and giving access to credit to an
otherwise neglected segment of the market. Many customers of payday
loans feel they have nowhere else to go.24 Payday lenders target consumers who have low income and too little collateral to borrow from a
bank. 25 Banks also do not offer short-term, small loans, and very often
payday loan customers are not able to qualify for a credit card.26 Customers frequently need the money for an emergency or unexpected
expense,27 and are unable to find another source of credit with which to
" Bruch , supra, n. I at 1276; Drysdale & Kcc:st, supra, n. 11 at 642. The issue has oot been
fully litigated in Canada, however it is notable that a number of class actions have been
recently certified based on restitutiomary claims arising from the alleged charging of criminal rates of interest (under the earlier version of section 347 of the Criminal Code) on
payday loans. See: McCutcheon v. Cash Store Inc. (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 2973, (2006]
O.J. No. 1860, 27 C.P.C. (6th)293, 80 O .R. (3d)644 (Ont. S.CJ.);Smith v. National Money
Mart Co. (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 29 , [2007) OJ. No. 46, 29 E.T.R. (3d) 199, 37 C.P.C.
(6th) 171 (Ont. S.C.J.); leave to appeal refused (2007), 2007 CanwellOnt 2177, 30 E.T.R.
(3d) 163 (Ont. Div. Ct): MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co.. 200S Carswe118C 436.
(2005] B.CJ. No. 399, 2005 BCSC 27 1 (B.C. S .C.); leave to appeal refused 2006
CarswellBC 2330, 2006 BCCA 393, 229 B.C.A.C. 278, 379 W.A.C. 278 (B.C. C.A. [In
Chambers)); Kilroy v. A OK Payday loans Inc., 2006 CarswellBC 2039, [2006) B.C.J. No.
1885, S9 8 .C.L.R. (4th) 78, [2006) 12 W.W.R. 626, 2006 BCSC 1213, 21 8.L.R. (4th)42,
273 D.L.R. (4th) 2SS (B.C. S.C.); affinned 2007 CarswellBC 842, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 467,
240 8 .C.A.C. ISi. 398 W.A.C. ISi. 2007 BCCA 231. 278 D.L.R . (4th) 193. (20071 8
W.W.R . 480, 30 B.L.R. (4th) 87, 66 8.C.L.R. (4th) 360 (B.C. C.A.); Bodnar v. Payroll
Loans Ltd., 2006 Carswell8C I 86S, (2006] B.C.J. No. 1705, 2006 8CSC 1132 (B.C. S .C.);
Tracy v. lnstalcans Financial Schltions Centres ( 8. C. JUd. , 2006 Carswell BC 1791, (2006 J
B.CJ. No. 1639, 2006 8CSC 1018 (B.C. S .C.); leave to appeal allowed 2006 CarswellBC
2023, (2006) B.C.J. No. 18SS, 2006 IBCCA 373 ( B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]); reversed 2007
CarswellBC 2 392. (2007) B.C.J. N'o. 2182. 2007 8CCA 481 . 246 8 .C.A.C. 296. 406
W.A.C. 296, 48 C .P.C. (6th) IS7, 28.S D.L.R. (4th) 41 3 (8 .C. C.A.); Bodnarv. Cash Store
Inc., 2005 CarswellBC 204S, [200S) B.C.J. No. 1904, 2005 BCSC 1228 (B.C. S .C.);
affirmed 2006 Carswell8C 1267, [2006) B.C.J. No. 1171, [2006) 9 W .W.R. 4 1, SS B.C.L.R.
(4th) 53, 374 W.A.C. 109, 227 8 .C .A.C. 109, 2006 BCCA 260 (B.C. C.A.); and Ayrton v.
PRL Financial (Alta.) Lid., 2006 CarswellAlta 319, (2006) A.J. No. 296, 2006 ABCA 88,
384 A.R. I. 367 W.A.C. I. 26S D.L.R. (4th) 240. (20061 7 W .W .R. 36. S7 Alta. L.R. (4th)
I, 26 C.P.C. (6th) W3 (Alta. C.A.).
,,. Scott Andrew Schaaf, "From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending
Industry" (2001) S N.C. Banking Inst. 339 at 344; Iain Ramsay, "Access to Credit in the
Alternative Consumer Credit Market" (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer Affairs,
Industry Canada, February 2000), online: < http://cmcweb.ca/epiclsitelcmc-cmc.nsf/
vwapj/ramsay_c.pdf/SFILFJramsay_e.pdf> at 17.
15 Butler & Park, supra, n. 9 at 123.
2• Schaaf, supra, n. 24 at 343.
27
Ibid., at 346.
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meet the cost. Pawnbrokers require something to pawn, and borrowing
from family members may be too embarrassing or difficult. 28 Though
payday lenders do charge a high rate of interest. some have argued that
they are still cheaper than writing a cheque that is returned dishonoured,29
and to completely outlaw payday lenders may fon::e this vulnerable
group to tum to loan sharks and more criminal lenders.30
Payday lenders are also quick and easy to access, and make minority
and disenfranchised groups feel more at ease. Sometimes, customers
will choose payday loans over a bank because they are more friendly
and accessible, providing more immediate liquidity.31 Other times, banks
are just too inconvenient - payday lenders have more flexible hours than
banks, and better locations.32 For example, in Toronto and Vancouver,
banks have tended to close more branches in lower income areas, and
"payday lenders are moving aggressively into this competitive vacuum."33 Payday lenders also make more of an effort to solicit the local
community than banks, and will often have employees who speak the
language of the dominant ethnic group of the neighbourhood.34

2. THE BUSINESS MODEL FOR PAYDAY LENDERS IN
CANADA
The main line of business for payday lenders is, as the name implies,
making payday loans. Those are typically short-term, single-payment
loans: The lender agrees to lend the debtor a certain amount of money,
in return for the promise of repayment (usually on a cheque from the
debtor, post-dated to the date of his or her next paycheque) and certain
fees. The fees are typically $15-25 per $100 of loan granted, and are
fixed without regard to the term of the loan; 3 ' it costs a consumer on
Huckstep, supra, n. 2 at 209.
Schaaf, supra, n. 24 al 344
)0 Ibid~ at 344.
, , Ibid .• at 344.
32 Susan MacDonnell. Losing Ground: Thl Persistent Growth of Family Poverty in Canada's
Largest City (Toronto: United Way of Greater Toronto, 2007) at 49.
21

29

JJ

ACORN report, supra, n. 2 at 15.

Lesly Jean-Paul & Luxman Nathan, "Check Cashers: Moving from the Fringes to the
financial Mainstream. Communities and Banking" (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
Boston, Mass.), Summer 1999, online: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, < hnp://
www.bos.frb.org> at 9.
35 See Nicole Macintyre, " A Maze of Fast Cash and Fees" Toronto Star (2 NovembeT 2007),
online: < http:llwww.thestar.com/Newslarticle/279327>. For example. Money Mart. an
34
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average $50 to take out a $300 loan for 14 days. 36 The average loan is
about $280 for around a period of 10 days.37

The lender determines the creditworthiness of the debtor through
basic documentation - proof of identity that shows the borrower has
attained the age of majority and the borrower's address, and proof of a
steady income and a chequing account. 38 Many payday lenders advertise
that they do not perform a credit check.39 ln the case of default, practices
vary, but few payday lenders will tum to litigation as the loans are for
small amounts, and the likelihood of enforcing judgment against a defaulting payday borrower is low.40 Loans that cannot be recovered are
written off by lenders as a bad debt expense." Despite the risks in the
industry, in Canada, the annual profit for payday lenders in 2004 was
estimated at $1 billion.42
Between the costs of bad debt, and the overhead and other costs of
running a payday lending business, the average Canadian finn incurs a
cost of $20.66 per $100 of loans.43 However, big loan operators have
lower costs than smaller "mom-and-pop" operations, and if their market
share is accounted for in creating a weighted average, t~e average cost
is only $15.69 per $100 loan.~
Naturally, profits per loa.n are higher for repeat customers than for
first-time borrowers, as the costs of opening a new client file and verifying employment information have already been incurred. The cost of
"industry leader" according to the Toronto Star, charges $18.94/$1 WI week; Speedy Cash
charges $25 per $100 borrowed. See also lain Ramsay,··Access to Credit in the Alternative
Consumer Credit Market'" (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Can<http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/C2-543ada, February 2000), online:
2000E.pdf>, though older suggests !lhe same fees at ii.
M MacDonnell, supra, n . 32 at 48.
.:-17 "What is a Payday Loan?" (Hamilton: Canadian Payday Loan Association, 2008) online:
<http://www.cpla-acps.ca/englisti/aboutloans.php>.
31 See, for example, payday loan providers like Payday Cash Advance Loans ( online: <http:/
/www.paydaycashadvanceloans.bi:z/faq.asp>) and Speedy Cash (on line: <http://
www .spccdycash.ca/SC-cash·adva~es-payday-loans-howitworks.php> ).
'" Such as National Cash, (online: < http://www.apaydayloan.ca/ontariopaydayloan.php>)
and Speedy Cash, (online: < http://www.spcedycash.ca/SC-cash-advances-payday-loanshowitworks.php> ).
40 Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at 18.
• 1 The Cost of Providing Payday Loam in Canada (Ernst & Young: 2004) at 4 ("Ernst &
Young Report").
2
• MacDonnell , supra. n. 32 at 49.
"Ernst & Young Repon , supra, n. 41 at 29.
.. I bid., at 31.
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a new loan is $29.35 per $100 in a weighted average of payday lenders
across Canada, while rollover or repeat loans only cost $14.15 in the
same study.•!! This means that as stores mature and gain more repeat
business, they become significantly more profitable.46
Fortunately for payday lenders, the debtors who use payday lenders
are often repeat customers - Ernst & Young estimated that first-time
borrowers end up taking out an average of fifteen loans. 47 This desire
for repeat customers can be seen through their behaviour as many payday
loan companies encourage customer loyalty; one goes as far as offering
a "no fee" third loan as a bonus for customer loyalty.48
In Canada, typical borrowers are either young, single men, or young
families with children,49 though other studies (commissioned by the
payday lending industry) have found the average age of borrowers to
range from 38 in Manitoba to 40 in British Colombia.'° They tend to be
low-income, but employed, since proof of employment is required for
many loans." Families with little savings or no credit cards, particularly
those who had been refused, were significantly more likely to have used
payday loans.s~
Families with outstanding bill or loan payments were more than
four times as likely to have used payday loans, even after controlling for

"Ibid., at 7, 34, 36.
46 See ibid.; see also Chris Robinson, R',egulation of Payday Lending in Canada (ACORN
Canada: Vancouver, 2006), online: <http://www.acom.org/fileadmin/Centers/Pn:ss/Report/Payday-Lcnding_Canada.pdf#scarch~pcr cent22acorn%C20study%C20payday%
C201enders%C20canada%22>; see also James Daw, ''Consumer Protection in the Wind
on Payday Loans" Toronto Star (30 May 2006) at D6 (discussing lhe Robinson report).
" Cited in MacDonnell, supra, n . 32 at 48.
" Mcintyre, supra, n. 35.
49
MacDonnell, supra, n. 32 at 49. The Canadian Survey of Financial Security indicates that
young families were three times more likely to have used payday loans than !hose aged 3S
to 44, after controlling for other family characteristics. Sec: <http://www.swcan.ca/english/freepub/7S-001 -XIEl10407/an- l.htm#Kitcbing>. The Survey of Financial Security
covered about 5,300 families and collected information on dte assets and debts of families
and individuals between May and July 2005.
!O Payday Loon Customer Service - Manitoba (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday Loan
Association <http:/lwww.cpla-acps.<:a/english/reportslMB%20Polllra%20Poil%20Sept
%202007.pdf> at 3, Payday Loan Customer Service - British Columbia (Pollara: 2007)
online: Canadian Payday Loan ASS<>Ciation <http://www.cpla-11cps.ca/english/rcportsl
3631%20BC%20CPLA ~20Report%20FINAL%20(0ct%2026).pdf> at 3.
51 MacDonnell. supra. n. 32 at 49.
52 See < http://www .statcan.calcnglish/freepub/75-00 J. XIFJI 0407/art- I .htrn#Kitching>.
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other key characteristics such as income and savings.53 Four in ten
families who borrowed money through payday loans had spending that
eJC;ceeded income, substantially more than families who had not used
payday loans.~ Almost half of families who used payday loans had no
one to tum to if they faced financial difficulty. 55 More than one-quarter
reported that they could not handle an unforeseen expenditure of $500,
and nearly half could not handle one of $5,000. 36
Payday lenders have primarily retail store locations, "tucked in
between variety and convenience store outlets." 57 Their main appeal is
that they provide cash instantly, without a hold period, and that they are
"non-judgmental" and friendlier than banks; often, payday lenders will
ensure they have employees who speak the language of the local community to increase their appeal.~8 That these business choices make a
difference to borrowers can be seen through a recent survey of payday
users in Ontario conducted on behalf of the Canadian Payday Lending
Association, the majority of whom stated that they used payday lenders
because they are quick and easy.~9
Payday lenders are not a homogenous group. There are a few larger
chains, and a number of smaller providers, some of which are being
acquired by national chains (and have been since 2000),w and not every
payday lender is structured the same way. There is the traditional model,
where the payday loan outlet is lending its own money. There is also the
broker model, where the payday lender covers the overhead costs, but
is lending out a third party's money; the third party bears the risk of a
loan default. Finally, in the insurance model, the lender charges a fixed
fee for the loans, and an additional insurance premium charge which is
designed to cover the costs of the loan and the risk of a default; the

» /bid.
••Ibid.
" Ibid.
16 Ibid.
" MacDonncll, supra, n. 32 at 43.
" Ibid.. at 49; Ramsay. !lupra. n. 24 at 17.

Payday Loan CU!ltomt r Service - Ontario (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday Loan
Association, < http://www.cpla-acps.ca/cnglish/rcports/3631%200ntario%20CPLA %20
Rcport%20FINAL%20(0ct%2026).[pdf> at 11 and15.
"" Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at ii.
19
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insurance company which assumes this fee is usually owned by the same
payday loan operator.6 '

3. THE REGULATORY SCHEME GOVERNING PAYDAY
LENDERS
(a)

Federal Legislation

The main federal legislation governing payday lenders is found in
s. 347 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits entering into arrangements
or receiving payment of interest at a criminal rate.62 A criminal rate is
defined as any interest rate of over 60 per cent per annum; interest
includes all charges and expenses, such as fees or penalties, but not
official fees or overdraft charges, for example.63 However, that legislation was drafted to aid police in prosecutions of loan sharks: rather than
as consumer protection legislation.64 There have been two attempts to
change the status of the section federally and make it more directed
towards payday lenders. The first, Bill S-19, failed due to an election.65
Bill C-26, however, came into force after receiving Royal Assent on
May 3, 2007. The Bill defines payday loans as "an advancement of
money in exchange for a post-dated cheque, a preauthorized debit or a
future payment of a similar nature but not for any guarantee, suretyship,
overdraft protection or security on property and not through a margin
loan, pawnbroking, a line of credit or a credit card.' 066 It then exempts
payday loans for under $1500 and for fewer than 62 days from the scope
of the Criminal Code, allowing for provincial regulation of the area, if
the province exercises its option to regulate under the new s. 347. I (3).67
••Ernst& Young Repon, supra, n. 41 at7.
61 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. s. 347(1).
63 Ibid.• s. 347(2).
64
Mary Anne Waldron, "Section 347 of the Criminal Code: •A Deeply Problematic Law"'
(Paper presented lO the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, August 2003) online: <http:/
/www.ulcc.ca/enlpoam21Section-347-Criminal-Code.pdf> at para 2-3, 11 .
.. Jennifer Babe, "Section 347 of the Criminal Code of Canada: Business Law Problems
Remain" (Paper presented to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, September 2007) at
4.
66 Criminal Codt, supra, n. 23, s. 347.1(1)
67 Ibid., ss. 347. I(2) and (3). See also the testimony of federal officials before House and
Senate Committees during Parliamentary consideration of C-26, online: < http://
cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/ComrnineePublicatlon.aspx?COM = I0476&Sourceld = 188~80&:
SwitchLanguage= I > and < http://www.parl.gc.ca.38.1.parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/
banlc-e/16eva-e.htm?Language=E&P:arl =39&.Ses = l&com~ =3>.
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Essentially, the province must regulate to protect payday borrowers, at
which point the Governor in Council will designate the province under
the section, or allow it to "opt-out."
Some provinces have subsequently taken steps to regulate payday
lenders, though a few still have not. The provinces that have not yet
attempted to regulate payday lenders are: Newfoundland and Labrador,
the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon (though there possible
amendments are under review). The other provinces all have regulation,
either in force or pending.

(b)
(i)

Provincial Legislation
Overview

The following is an overview of the recent provincial efforts to
regulate payday lenders. The chart found in Appendix A provides a
detailed comparison of the provincial regulation. Bill C-26 provides
some direction as to what is required under the provincial regulation,
however, it leaves room for the provinces to be designated and opt out
of the federal regime with different approaches to regulation. Bill C-26
requires a licensing or other type of authorization system for lenders,
the establishment of limits on the total cost of borrowing, and a framework of protections for consumers. In seeking to fit within the Bill C26 requirements for designation, the following five components are
provided for in most provinces' legislation, although there is variation
among the provinces in how this is done:
a. Interest Rate Caps: Each province's regulation gives either the province, through regulation, or a body, such as the
Energy Commission, the ability to set an interest rate cap.
With the exception of Quebec, which has set its interest rate
cap at 35 per cent, and Manitoba, which has set the maximum at $ 17 per $ 100 loaned, without regard to the term of
the loan (with certain exceptions). The other provinces have
not yet set interest rate caps.
b. Cancellation Protection: One to two business days is provided by each province for borrower cancellation rights.
c. Information in Agreement: There is variation among the
provinces. Some provinces require disclosure of the cost of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the loan and how this is done varies. Other provinces only
require a statement that the loan is a high cost loan.

d. Rollover Prohibitions: Each province prohibits rollovers
or charging an additional fee for a rollover.
e. Licensing: Each province requires licensing of payday
lenders and the requirements for licensing range from payment of a fee to sample loan documents. The licensor diffe.rs
from province to province.
f. Posted Warning: With the exception of one province that
has the ability to regulate this and has not done so and
another province that does not provide for this component
of the legislation, all provinces require disclosure of the cost
of credit. One province requires disclosure that indicates
the loans are high cost loans.
g. Remedies: Remedies range from an administrative penalty
of up to $10,000 to not being required to pay any amount
over the principal amount borrowed.
(ii)

Alberta

In their 2007 budget, the government of Alberta designated as one
of its goals the reform of the Fair Trading Act to address marketplace
issues around payday lenders. 68 It intends to regulate payday lenders
through regulations passed pursuant to that Act. but it is still in consultations at this point.
(iii)

British Columbia

In British Columbia, the B ill69 to regulate payday lenders was given
royal assent on November 22, '2007 and amends the Business Practices
and Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act.10 The Bill
adds a Part 6. 1 to the Business Practices and Consumer Act, with the
title of "Payday Loans." This part allows the Lieutenant Governor in
Council to set a maximum cost for payday loans and requires payday
.. " Budget 2007: Goal 2" (Government of Albena: 2007) onli ne: Ministry of Finance < http:/
/www.finance.gov .ab.ca/publicationslbudgetlbudget2007/scrvicc.....ab.html >.
6t Bill 27, Business Practices and Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act, 3d
Sess.. 38th Parl.. British Columbia. 2007.
70

S.B.C. 2004, c. 2.
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lenders to be licensed. 71 It also sets out a host of rights for payday loan
consumers, including the right to cancel the loan before the end of the
subsequent day or if it does not satisfy the written notice requirements;12
sets out clear disclosure requirements;73 and prohibits rollovers and
second loans while loans already exist. 74 Licensing and compliance
enforcement will be administered by the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Authority, a not-for-profit organization that operates
at ann's length from government.
(iv)

Manitoba

After the changes to the Criminal Code, Manitoba made changes
to the Consumer Protection Act1 ~ through the Consumer Protection
Amendment Act (Payday Loans).16 These changes require licensing for
payday lenders, and require them to give warnings to their customers
about the costs of borrowing. The Act also authorizes the Manitoba
Public Utility Board to set out a maximum cost of credit for payday
loans, and prohibits additional fees on renewals, extensions, or new loans
to replace old loans, unless otherwise authorized by the Board. The new
Act also prohibits signing over of future wages and title loans, and gives
the right to cancel a loan within 48 hours without penalty. Finally, the
Manitoba Consumers Bureau has the right to inspect licensed premises,
and to access unlicensed operations if there is evidence that payday loans
are being made there. 77
Pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act, Manitoba has drafted the
Payday Loans Regulation.18 This regulation specifies the licensing process and bonding requirements for payday lenders, and stipulates the
information that must be in a loan agreement.79 It also requires payday
lenders to post signs with clear warnings that "payday loans are high
cost loans" and other information about the costs of payday lenders. 80
Ibid., s. 112.02.
Ibid., s. 112.05.
" Ibid., s. I 12.06.
74 Ibid., s. I 12.08(1 Xa) and (b).
1s C .C.S.M. c. C-200.
11

12

S.M. 2006, c. 31.
"Province Announces Next Steps in Payday Loan Regulation" online: Government of
Manitoba, <http://news.gov.mb.ca/newslindex.html?archive=2007-6-0I &item= 1751 >.
11 Man. Reg. 9912007.
76

77

'
•

0
0

Ibid., s. 14.
Ibid.• s. 16(3).
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Section 147( l) of the Consumer Protection Act also provides the Manitoba Public Utilities Board with the ability to set a limit on the costs of
credit given by payday lenders. The Board set the maximum at $17 per
$100 loaned without regard to the term of the loan (with a number of
nuances for special situations and for loans about $500) on April 4,
2008.8 1
(v)

New Brunswick

In New Brunswick, Bill 4, An Act Respecting Payday Loans,82
passed the second reading as of December 12, 2007. Like the other
provinces, the Bill is designed to protect payday borrowers through
licensing and bonding requirements for payday lenders,83 informational
requirements on the payday loan itself (including all fees and penalties
charged),114 no-fee cancellation options,85 posted information about the
cost of loans,86 and it grants the government the ability to limit the cost
of credit.87
(vi)

Nova Scotia

The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is currently in consultations to determine the limits to be set on payday lending. To that end,
they held public hearings in January 2008 to consider preliminary issues
including the maximum cost of borrowing and the maximum fees or
rates that could be charged by payday lenders.88
The authority to embark on these consultations was granted by the
Consumer Protection Act (amended), which received Royal Assent on
November 23, 2006.89 Sections I 8A-18U of that Act provide for similar
11

Consumer Protection Act, supra, n. 75, Part XVIII. The interest rate cap was introduced
by the Manitoba Public Utilitie s Board Act Order 39/08 onli ne: < http://
www.pub.gov.mb.ca/pdflmisc/39-08.pdf>.
12 2nd Sess .• S6dt Parl .. New Brunswic k, 2007. This Bill will amend the Cost of Credit

Disclosure Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-28.3.
37.12; 37. lS.
14
Ibid., ss. 37.28(2Xm).

13 Ibid., SS.

.. Ibid., s. 37.29.
16 I bid., s. 37.3.

" Ibid.• s. 37.3 1.
Nova Scotia Utilities Review Board, "Payday Loans, Notice of Public Hearings" onlinc:
Ca nadian Payday Loan Association < http://www.cpla-acps.ca/engl ish/reports/NS%20Payday-1..oanS-Notice.pdf>.
19
S .N.S., 2006, c.25.
11
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protections to all other provinces. There is a permit requirement for
payday lenders.90 infonnational requirements in the loan agreement.91
and cancellation provisions.92 The Act also grants the Nova Scotia Utilities and Review Board the ability to set a maximum cost of borrowing
and other controls.93
(vii)

Ontario

In Ontario, amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, 2002
requiring greater disclosure by payday lenders are already in effect. They
pertain to the posting of a disclosure poster that must indicate certain
pieces of information. For instance, payday lenders must display the
cost per hundred dollars of the loans they grant. They also require that
payday lenders display the cost of a "$300 loan over a period of 14
days."94 Further changes also require a standard form for payday loans
which will also provide greater information to the consumer. 9~
Most recently, on March 31, 2008 the Government announced Bill
48: Payday Loans Act,96 which will be in addition to the provisions in
the Consumer Protection Act, 2002. It requires all payday lenders and
brokers to be licensed and establishes a Registrar to inspect lenders and
enforce provisions under the Act. 97 The Act seeks to protect borrowers
by prohibiting lenders from making misleading claims about the total
cost of borrowing.98 It also provides for a two-day cancellation period
where the borrower can cancel the loan agreement and pay back the
advance.99 The lender is forced to return all documents and fees pertaining to the cost of borrowing, without penalty. The Act also provides for
very broad regulations pertaining to the specific responsibilities of licensees, governing their activities, setting limits that payday lenders and
90 Ibid., SS. ISC-G.
" /bid., ss. 181·N.
92 Ibid., s. ISQ.
93 Ibid.. s. !ST.
94 0. Reg. 17/05 as am by 0. Reg. 187/fJl 61. I . According to 61. I there is no requirement to
have the APR disclosed on the poster, the only requirement is that it is disclosed in the loan
agreement itself.
., Ibid., s. 62 . I .
96 Bill 48. Payday Loans Act. Ist Sess.• 39th Part. . Ontario. 2008 (first reading on March 3 1.
2008).
97
Ibid., s. S.

'" Ibid., s. 26( I).
"" Ibid., s. 30( I).
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brokers may charge and governing the required contents for payday loan
agreements. 100 Remedies include: a rebate on the cost of borrowing for
borrowers who entered into agreements not consistent with the Act,
freezing of assets of delinquent lenders, 101 and the imposition of administrative penalties not exceeding $10,000.102
Finally, the Act established a special fund, known as the Ontario
Payday Lending Education Fund (OPLEF), to educate borrowers about
their rights under the Act. 103 The OPLEF will be a non-profit corporation
and will be funded in part by the payday lenders and brokers. The OPLEF
is required to report on its activities and administration through an annual
report to the Minister who will then deposit the report with the Assembly. 1°' Ontario is the only province to include an educational component
in its legislation.
The Minister hailed the new legislation as an attempt to balance
protecting consumers while supporting a legitimate industry to continue
to grow. io5 When pressed on why the legislation does not contain a clear
unambiguous interest rate cap, the Minister said more information was
required. He established an independent expert panel, representing business and poverty activists, to examine the rate cap and report at a later
date. 106
A number of Members of Parliament, such as Andrea Horwath,
have already criticized the Bill as not going far enough to protect consumers.107 She believes that an interest rate cap should be clearly included in the Bill as well as a 30 day "cooling-off' period for rescission.108 Another Member of Parliament, Cheri DiNovo, states that "we
don't need payday lenders. Payday lenders are usurious. These are un-

100

Ibid. . s. 77.

IOI

Ibid.. s. S2( I).

102

Ibid. , s. S9( 1)-(3).

IQl

Ibid.• s. 66-67.

Ibid., s. 74.
Intervie w of Government Services Minister Ted McMeckin, (I April 2008) on Me1ro
Morning, CBC Radio, Toronto, CBC Radio Archives.
'°" Ibid.
"" First Reading of Bill 48, Debates and Proceedings, March 3 1, 2008 < http://
www.ontla.on.ca/weMtousc-~ngslhousc....detail.do?Date = 200S.-033J&.Parl = 39&.Sess= J&locale= en#PARAl 39>.
IOI Ibid.
1<><
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necessary services and they leech off the poor." 109 Howard Hampton,
leader of the provincial NOP Party, called the legislation superficial and
criticized the government as being "scared" to put the payday loan
industry out of business with an interest rate cap. 110
Representatives from ACORN Canada (Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now) again stresSect the importance of an
interest rate cap - "It's either going to protect people and keep money
from getting sucked out of low-income neighbourhoods or not, depending on what the interest rate is." 111 Other poverty activists stressed the
need for education that would actually find its way to the most vulnerable
consumers. 112 They recommend starting education campaigns in payday
locations or through different anti-poverty groups. However, poverty
activists were quick to note that the education can only go so far when
consumers are also placed with crushing time pressures in paying back
the loan within several days. 113 The Canadian Payday Loan Association
("CPLA") remains silent on the new legislation, as of April 1, 2008.
However, in an interview CPLA President Stan Keyes applauded the
Bill as a right balance. 114 Keyes refused to comment on an "interest rate
cap based on APR", calling it a meaningless number.• u However, he
does support the use of fee caps of between $20-23 per $ t 00 loan. 116
(viii)

Prince Edward Island

PEl's Bill 100, Payday Loans Act, has not yet moved past the first
reading, which occurred in the spring 2006 legislative session. 117 However, if passed, the Bill will implement many of the same changes seen
in the other provinces, including licensing, 118 maximum cost of credit, 119

109

Joanna Smith and Robert Benzie. "Payday loan crackdown" Toronto Star (April I. 2008).
on line: The Star < http:/lwww.thestar.com/News/Ontario/article/4078 I 3>.

Supra. n. 16.
Supra, n. 20.
112
Interview of Miryam Zcballos, ( I April 2008) on Metro Morning, CBC Radio, T oronto,
CBC Radio Archives.
113 lbUJ.
11
• Supra, n. 16.
115 lbUJ.
116 fbid.
117
4lh Sess., 62nd Parl.. Prince Edward Island, 2007.
"' Ibid., s. 10.
119
/bUJ., s. 11.
110
111
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getting appropriate information to the consumer, 120 and penalty-free
cancellation within the first 48 hours. 121
(ix)

Quebec

Quebec's Consumer Protection Act requires that a lender have a
license to operate there, and courts have decided to only grant licenses
if the creditor charges less than 35 per cent interest rate, because the
loan is otherwise unconscionable under s. 8 and so can be denied under
s. 325. 122 There are no payday lenders legally operating in Quebec. 123
(x)

Saskatchewan

Like the other provinces that have sought to regulate payday lenders, Saskatchewan provides similar protections to borrowers in the province. An Act Respecting Payday Loan Agreements, Payday Lenders and
Borrowers received royal assent and came into effect in May 2007. 124 It
has licensing requirements for lenders,•~ disclosure requirements for
the protection of borrowers through public signage126 and the credit
agreement, 127 and allows the province to set a maximum rate for credit. 128
However, again, the maximum has not yet been set by regulation.

(c) Self-regulation by Payday Lenders
The CPLA is the largest Canadian association of payday lenders,
and claims to represent 500 of the 1350 payday lending stores in Canada. 129 It claims that its Code of Best Business Practices ("Code") is
recognized as the "world's toughest voluntary code of conduct," and it

Ibid., s. 12.
Ibid., s. 13.
l22 R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, SS. 8, 325.
123
Government of Ontario, .. New Payday Lending Rules Now in Effect Across Ontario..
online: Ministry of Government and Consumer Services < http://ogov.newswire.ca/on
tariclOPOFJ2007/08/01/c2939.htm171match=&.lang=_e.htrnl>.
124 2007, c. P-4.3.
1
" Ibid., Part II.
126
Ibid., s. 2 1.
ilO

121

tn
IJa
1:19

Ibid., s. 18.

Ibid.• s. 23.
Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner, "Annual Report 2()()6.2007" {Canadian
Payday Loan Association: Hamilton, 2008) online: <http://www.cplaethicscommis
sioner.ca/english/pdf/OElc_cPLA-AnnualReporL0607.pdf> [.. Annual Repo11·1.
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has recently set up a Commissioner of Ethics and Integrity, whose job
it is to independently enforce the practices in the Code. 130
The Code, first and foremost, prohibits rollover loans, which are
widely decried by industry critics. 13 ' In doing so, it specifically bars
members from granting loan extensions for a fee, or from advancing a
new loan to pay down an existing loan. The Code also prohibits multiple
loans in excess of the initial amount the lender was approved for, and
prevents lenders from taking collateral. Funher, it sets a limit on the
amount a member may charge on the default of the loan, and only allows
lenders to charge post-maturity interest at a rate of $0.90/week for the
first 13 weeks, and $0.50 per week thereafter.
Members are also required to recommend credit counselling to any
customer who has defaulted twice within a year, and offer to forego
accrual of interest for customers who do go into counselling. There are
also restrictions on the type of loans that a member may offer- a member
may not give a loan based on some social assistance payments or take
an assignment of wages, neither may they grant a loan over $1500 or a
loan for a term of over 31 days.
The Code also has similar requirements to many of the provinces'
proposed or enacted legislation, in allowing no-penalty cancellation of
the loan if done by the end of the next business day. It also stipulates
that the member should disclose to the customer the "high-cost nature
of the payday loan on all Joan documentation." 132 Notably, however, the
one area that the Code does not touch on is the amount that can be
charged in fees and interest (until maturity) on loans.
This Code is enforced by the Office of Ethics and Integrity Commissioner, a position funded by CPLA but designed to operate indepen·

' '" "Canadian Payday Loan Association Appoints Former Law Enforcement Oftkial Sid
Peckford Ethics and Integrity Co:mmissioncr~ (RTO Online: 2006) online: < http:/!
www .rtoonline.com/ContentfArticlc/May06'CanadianPaydayloanAS$0CiationAppoints
PickfordEthics()S0406.asp>.
13 1 ''Code of Best Business Practices" (Canadian Payday Loan Association: Hamilton, 2008)
on line: < http:/fwww.cpla-acps.ca/english/consumcrcodc.php>. Recall that in most "horror stories" about payday loans in the press, the journalist will give the example of a person
who got a rollover loan and ended up making payments for months without paying down
the initial loan because the loan was rolled over.
"' Ibid.
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dently. 133 Any complaints about a violation of the Code are made via a
1-800 number staffed by a full time Compliance Officer who will determine which prospective viQlations require further action, and will
make submissions with recommendations on each violation for the Commissioner. The Commissioner then has the mandate to investigate and
follow-up on any violations brought to his attention; he also has the
ability to issue warnings, or fine or otherwise discipline members who
have not complied with the Code. In 2007, 164 complaints were made
via the 1-800 number or email~ 87 were deemed to merit further investigation; in 16 cases the Commissioner concluded a violation occurred;
10 members were sanctioned and the other 6 responded with a "satisfactory resolution" to the matter. 13'

4. CALLING ON CANADIAN PAYDAY LENDERS
On March 22 and March 28, 2008, a female student research assistant, along with a male research partner visited 4 different payday lenders
in downtown Toronto. In two cases, two locations of the payday lender
were visited, totaling 6 visits. The research assistant who conducted the
visits is a third year Osgoode Hall Law School student who is white, in
her mid-twenties, has worked with the author on payday lending research
for over three months, and has seven years of post-secondary education.
Her male friend, a third year medical student, is also white and in his
mid-twenties.
The instruction provided to the student was to obtain all the information that she could about how much it would cost to obtain a payday
loan and what she was required to do in order to obtain the loan. The
student has asked that her identity be kept anonymous as she is joining
a law firm upon graduation from law school that represents a major
player in the payday lending industry.

(a) Ontario Disclosure Requirements for Payday Lenders
Section 61.1(4) of the Coruumer Protection Act requires the following statements:
m "About the Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner" (Canadian Payday Loan
Association: Hamilton, 2008) online: < http://www.cplaethicscommissioner.ca/english/
about.html>.
'"' Annual Report, supra, n. 129 at 7.
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1. Total Cost of Borrowing per each $100 as heading (larger
font) .

2. Subheading indicating "$300 loan for 14 days" (smaller
fom).

3. "Principal Amount $300.00" AND "Total Cost of Borrowing" followed by the total cost of borrowing per each $300
advanced under the agreement.
4 . Horizontal line.
5. "Total to Repay".

6. "This sign conforms to the disclosure requirements under
the CPA".
The visits to the payday lenders indicated that most of the required
tenns were provided as per statutory requirements, however, payday
lenders' interpretation of the tenns varied widely. The following table
highlights the difficulty in trying to ascertain how much each loan cost
and to compare the cost of borrowing as between the differentn lenders.

Table 1
Disclosure

.Requirements
Total Cost of
Borrowing
per $100
(larger font)

Money
Mart

Cash

Cash Shop Cash Store

Money

$1.78 and $20.00
$19.45 with
optional
cheque
cashing
fees.

$20.00

$22.26
*($100 ineludes a$20
broker fee.)

"Example:
No number $60.00
$300 loan for included.
14 days"
(smaller
font).

No number No number
included.
included.

"Principal
Amount".

$300.00

$300.00

$300.00

$300.00
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''Total Cost $5.34
of Borrowing".

$20.00
$100
rowed.
$60.00
$300
rowed.

per $60.00
bor-

[23 B.F.L.R.)

$66.79

per
bor-

''Total to Re- $305.34
pay".

$360.00

"This
sign Included.
confonns to
the disclosure
requirements
under
the
CPA".

Included.

$360.00

$306.79

Included.

* Does not
reflect the
net amount
received; refleets
the
gross
amountborrowed.
Included.

*This statement is printed on the Cash Store's Disclosure Poster
(b)

Visits to 6 Toronto Payday Lenders

At each location, the student asked the following five questions.
The responses below are in her language. She relied on her research
panner to aid with data collection. He would enter the store after she
had left (or as she was leaving) and collect any promotional material
they might have had. After her departure from two of the six locations,
the store employee commented, without prompting, to the rest of individuals in the store on ' how many questions' she had asked, and that it
was 'funny' for her to want to write things down. These statements
clearly indicate that the student's haphazard way of collecting information was, in comparison to other payday borrowers, quite exceptional.

1. Whal is a payday loan?
Most operators replied that a payday loan is a short-term loan. They
would provide me with a certain amount of money, which I am
'
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expected to pay back on my next payday. This was usually about I 0
days, but could be extended or reduced depending on the next time I
would get paid.

2. What do I need to provide to qualify for a payday loan?
The following documents were required for me to apply for a loan.
But, it was not a guarantee of whether or not I'd be accepted. The
employees assured me that qualifying would take less then I 0
minutes. But when I asked what the process would involve (i.e. calling
employers etc. ) they didn't answer but instead refocused my attention
on how fast it would be.
Money Mart: A current bank statement; latest pay stub; post-dated
personal cheque.
Cash Money: Pay stub; personal cheque; bank statement (from today
or the day before).
Cash Shop: Proof of continuous employment at the same job for six
months; get paid through direct deposit; no more then I Non Sufficient Fund fee in the past 2 months,· 2 pay stubs; 2 pieces of ID; a
utility/phone bill; an updated bank statement for the last 45 days.
Cash Store: a current bank statement,· latest pay stub; personal
cheque; utility bill; personal references (family members who had
landlines were preferred).

3. What is the most money I could get?
All locations began by stipulating that I could get approved for up
to 50% of my net salary. Cash Shop said that since "I looked ok"
they would be able to go up to 70%. Cash Money also said that they
could go up to 70% for repeat customers who had a 'positive relationship' with Cash Money.

4. How much does it cost to borrow?
Each employee pointed to the poster and proceeded to read the poster
to me. When I asked specifically what the terms 'cost of borrowing'
and 'total to repay' meant, they declined to answer.
The Term 'Total Cost of Borrowing' varies widely from $5.34 and
$66.79. Furthermore Cash Money's use of the term is confusing by
stating the $20.00 first, even though the example asks for the $300
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example - which would then be $60.00.
The term 'Total to Repay' is also widely misinterpreted. You can see
that Cash Money and Cash Shop are relatively straightforward, the
consumer should repay $360.00 and one could assume that would
be the total written on my post-dated cheque or direct transfer form.
However, Money Mart and Cash Store indicate substantially lower
levels of 'Total to Repay'. But these totals do not include the brokerage and optional cheque cashing fees, which are in most cases mandatory charges.
At Cash Store, I was told that the brokerage fees were mandatory,
and were due to the fact that the Cash Store 'linked, me, the borrower
with an independent lender'. Cash Store did not actually lend me the
money themselves. I still do not know what total I would be required
to write on my post-dated cheque.
The optional cheque cashing fees employed by Money Mart were the
most confusing. All their advertising indicates that they charge 59%
interest, or about 90 cents/week per 100 dollar loan. However the
advertising also seems to indicate that there is an 'optional' cheque
cashing fee. Upon prompting, the store employee told me that if I
paid back the loan in full on the loan due date (the day before my
payday) I would pay the advertised rates. However, if I waited until
payday, Money Mart would cash my cheque and charge an extra
$19.95 per JOO dollars. This was seen as a convenience fee, and the
employee stressed this was optional - kind of like valet parking.
However, I find it very difficult to believe how someone who has
limited income, and took out a loan in the first place, would then be
able to pay it off BEFORE they receive their regular salary. Thus the
vast majority of borrowers are forced to pay this convenience fee.
I'm also concerned with the widespread use of the word 'AND' as
opposed to 'PLUS'. While it's a small change (and not illegal) I don't
think it conveys to the consumer that they are also responsible for
this charge.

5. Can I get a copy of the information?
Once they began providing details, I would ask if they had any
information written down. They usually had written information pertaining to the materials I needed to bring in to qualify for a loan.
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However, none of the information about prices was written down,
although they did let me copy the information on the poster down by
hand when I prompted. I clandestinely took the photos with my cell
phone.
I was able to get two loan applications. On Cash Shop's application
there appears to be a statement about wage assignment-which is
not legal in Ontario. [Pursuant to The Wages Act, 1990, payday
lenders are prohibited from taking wage assignments under subsection 7(7), which states that an assignment of wages to secure payment
of a debt is invalid. In addition, a representation that such assignments
are valid may be considered a false, misleading or deceptive representation under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.]

6. What if I can't pay the loan back?
On both the Cash Store and Money Mart's website it clearly says
that no rollovers are permitted.
The Cash Shop indicated that if I couldn't pay off the loan that they
would be able to renegotiate something with me. Cash Store also
said that I must pay off the loan, but if I thought that there was no
other way . then I was supposed to come into the store and talk to
them before my next payday.
Cash Money also indicated that I would have to pay off the loan on
my next payday. But if I was in dire circumstances they would wait
one or two days before cashing the cheque. The Cash Money employee also said that I should consider using the 'pick up' option to
pay off my loan. If I come in on my payday (not the day before) and
pay my loan in full, in cash, then they would immediately loan me
the same amount of my previous loan. This, she indicated, was considered a new loan and I would have to pay new fees associated with
taking out a loan. The Cash Money employee said the vast majority
of individuals preferred the pick-up option.
I thought it was rather odd that people would want to go through the
trouble of going to the payday loan, rather then letting the cheque
clear, since at Cash Money there is no cheque cashing convenience
fee. In other words, it would cost the same to pick up the loan or to
let the cheque clear. She said that if individuals waited 2 or 3 days
for the cheque to clear, they would not be able to take out another
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loan (since borrowers are only allowed one loan at a time). With the
pick-up option, they could take out the new loan on the same day.
One could assume therefore, that not only is this pick-up option a
rollover, but that the majority of borrowers rely upon them.
Even Money Mart, who prohibits rollovers under the CPLA Best
Practices, stated I could apply for a 'back-to-back' loan. If I had
enough funds to clear the first cheque, Money Mart would immediately loan me the exact amount that was just clearedfrom my account.
While not technically a rollover, the risk ofdebt spiral would still be
present-as I would never have enough money to clear the loan and
provide for myselffor the next two weeks. Money Mart would also
receive new fees from my 'back-to-back' loan every two weeks. For
example, if I pursued 'back-to-back' loans for one year (26 loans)
on a principal amount of $300 I would pay roughly $60 in interest
every two weeks. In this case, Money Mart would receive over $1,560
in interest (520% APR), for a $300 loan.
The student reports the following conclusion regarding her experience in attempting to get a payday loan and the relevant information:

I found it very difficult to determine how much the loan would ultimately cost me. I am therefore quite adamant in saying that the
average payday loan consumer may not know how much they are
paying for their loan when they sign the agreement, nor are they fully
capable of 'shopping around' to find the best deal.
I am even more convinced of my conclusion when one thinks that all
payday loan borrowers, through the act of looking for a loan, are
already under financial stress and will not be in the more contemplative state-of-mind I was experiencing. (i.e., I didn't actually need
the loan to pay for groceries, facing the risk of eviction etc. ) The
stress of 'getting the money now' would drastically impair one's
ability to effectively compute the highly complicated and intentionally
confusing information associated with payday loans.

5.

AMERICAN REGULATORY LESSONS

In contrast to the more mature American payday lending industry,
and accompanying attempts at regulation, the Canadian payday lending
industry is new and until fairly recently has been unregulated. Accordingly, this section reviews the dominant American approaches taken to
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regulate payday lenders with a view to drawing regulatory lessons for
the Canadian context.
(a)

Disclosure

Throughout history, methods of calculating interest and creating
the terms of credit contracts were notoriously inconsistent. m This became more problematic after the Second World War with the exponential
increase of moderately-priced consumer goods being bought on credit
by the middle-class.•:16 Arguably, this new consumer group Jacked the
expertise and patience necessary for appreciating the true meaning of
their rights and responsibilities pursuant to a credit contract. In essence,
consumers rarely understood the actual price they were paying for goods.
As a result, the federal government in the United States enacted the Truth
In Lending Act (TILA) in 1968. Creditors were required to calculate and
publish uniform interest rates. 137 With a uniform rate, consumers would
be able to quickly determine the 'price tag' and 'shop around' for the
best deal to suit their needs. There were two main disclosure elements.
The first was a 'finance charge' which equaled the sum of all charges
payable (directly or indirectly) by the creditor for extending the credit. 138
The second was the APR, which is a measure of the cost of credit,
expressed as a yearly rate. 139 The Act gave debtors the right to sue
creditors if they did not provide these uniform disclosures. In extreme
cases, non-complying creditors could face criminal prosecution. The
Act was later amended in 1980 to respond to different criticisms from
both lenders and borrowers.
Christopher Peterson notes that disclosure has remained the 'cornerstone' tool against predatory lending in the United States. 140 Its value
stems from the ability to reduce the information asymmetries that provided an undue advantage to creditors, while maintaining the integrity
and efficiency of markets. It is also seen as the least paternalistic, and
most consistent with a free market economy, of the tools, as it provides
us Peterson, supra, n. 17.
'"' Ibid., at 865.
m Ibid., at 8~.
"" Diane Hellwig, ~Exposing the Loan shark in Sheep' s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the
Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense" (2005) 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1567
at 1592.
139 Ibid.
..., Supra, n. 17 at 89 1.
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freedom for customers to contract necessary terms for themselves. Disclosure also allows legitimate lenders to continue to operate their busi-

nesses without anificially lowering interest rates or prohibiting certain
controversial practices. On this basis, Peterson argues that disclosure
might be the tool which holds the most promise. 141 While he admits that
Tll.A does not hold up to expectations, he believes it can be reformed.
Essential in this reform is re-conceptualizing disclosure as helping the
customer 'understand' the credit tenns instead of the current objective
of merely 'presenting' credit tenns to consumers. 142
Other scholars, however, have criticized Tll.A's structural deficiencies. Such scholars believe that the disclosures mandated in the Act
are not very useful to consumers. For instance, the APR does not include
many fees that lenders normally charge, and lenders themselves calculate
the APR inconsistently. " 3 This, according to Matthew Edwards, "means
that a creditor's APR might both understate the total cost of credit in an
absolute sense and impair comparison shopping between providers of
credit." 144 Second, TILA has been questioned since it conceptualizes
interest as a percentage. Ronald Mann argues that this goes against the
'street smans' of most people, s ince they compute interest in dollars. 1' 5
Diane Hellwig agrees noting that "converting dollars to percentages and
back again may present a challenge, especially when rates are subject to
change." 146 Forcing consumers to look at the percentage leads to more
confusion and abstraction. Matthew &!wards illustrates this point: "people don' t know what they are aware of." 147
Third, some critics worry that consumers are unable to cope with
the voluminous nature of disclosure mandated by TILA. Although the
Act underwent a simplification in 1980, many academics assert that
predatory lenders 'drown' their consumers with disclosure information
- and then hide behind contract law' s principles of contract formation.
Couns have consistently held that contractual parties have a duty to read
Ibid. , at 903.
Ibid.
143
M atthew Edwards, "Empirical and Behavioural Critiques of Mandatory Disclosurc:SocioEconomics and the Quest for Truth in Lending" (2005) 14 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 199
at 225.
144
Ibid.
'" Ronald Mann & Jim Hawkins, "J ust Until Payday" (2007) 54 UCLA L. Rev. 855 at 903.
146 Ibid., at 902.
1• 7 Supra. n. 143 at 231.
1 1
•

142

REGULATING PAYDAY LENDERS IN CANADA

353

the terms of the agreement. 143 However, when provided with such voluminous and potentially confusing information, one must ask to what
exlenl do the parties understand these tenns? The duty to read assumes
that the consumer has actually assented to the terms, but what happens
when this is a fiction?
Results from a 1992 national adult literacy study suggest that most
consumers lack the basic literacy skills to understand and compare loan
agreements. 149 The study found that 50 per cent of Americans (including
those with a university degree) were unable to understand the terms
under TILA, or even know where to look for these terms under the
mountain of information presented to them during credit negotiations. uo
Even more surprisingly, only 4 per cent of Americans were capable of
successfully calculating the APR. m Of course this raises the question:
why mandate the publication of the APR when 96 per cent of Americans
are unable to calculate it?
In addition, American commentators have expressed increased concern that payday lenders go out of their way to exacerbate TILA's
shortcomings to achieve the highest level of information asymmetry.
This results in a situation where neither actor is behaving in a rational
manner, thereby nullifying the assumptions which the disclosure model
is built upon. Techniques most often relied upon by lenders include oral
representations, manipulating the timing of disclosure and exploiting
English-language difficulties present in the target demographic. For
example, many court decisions in the United States have held that consumers were not authorized to rely on oral representations made (even
if they were false) if the "true terms" were contained in writing. "A party
who can read must read, or show a legal excuse for not doing so."is2
Therefore a party to a written contract cannot avoid its terms due to
inconsistent oral representations. Payday lenders have seized upon this
interpretation by stating that ..we will tell you what you need to know"
or informally criticizing the disclosure forms as "information you don't
really need to get your money right now" to lull the consumer into a
,.. Alan While & Cathy Mansfield , "Li.teracy and Contract" (2002) 13 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev.
233 at 253.
149 Ibid., at 233.
1
Ibid.. at 239.
m Ibid., at 238.
m Ibid., at 2S3.
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false state of complacency and refocus their attention on the promise for
quick money. 153
· The timing of disclosure has also been widely criticized. In the vast
majority of cases, disclosure does not occur until the contract has been
consummated. In fact, commentators have noted that many payday loan
offices refuse to let loan offer documentation leave the store until after
customers have signed them. 154 This leaves little room for the consumers
to 'shop around' and compare prices. Studies have demonstrated that at
the contract's consummation, many consumers have already verbally
and psychologically committed to the deal. m Consequently, it is very
unlikely that disclosure will terminate the transaction. This is compounded by the fact that the consumer has spent certain sunk costs (travel
costs, time off work) to inquire about this specific loan and are less
likely to repeat the process.
To counteract these allegations, the American payday lending industry has developed a 'Best Practices' policy which states that lenders
should provide proper disclosure information to all consumers applying
for a loan. However, several authors note that the majority of payday
lenders were non-compliant with this provision. 156 Furthennore, some
lenders submit to unscrupulous behaviour in an attempt to prevent shopping around. For example, some lenders verify the employment status
of the borrower by caJling their superiors before they disclose the APR. 157
Therefore in the case of a rational consumer who wanted to compare
prices, their supervisor may receive several calls about this matter. Not
only does this highlight the fact the consumer is facing financial difficulties, but the supervisor may become annoyed or concerned that the
employee is taking time to get a loan. Finally. all of these factors are
compounded by the fact that a significant percentage of payday borrowers lack English-language speaking skills. m Therefore borrowers place
an even higher level of reliance on the payday lender to get their money,
fast, and without too many questions.

Ibid., at 2S4.
Ibid.
'"' Peterson, ~upra, n. 17 at 895.
ill> Johnson, supra, n. 2 at 32.
157 Peterson, supra. n. 17 at 896.
1
" ' Edwards, supra, n. 143 at 232.
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(b) Interest Rate Caps
Interest rate caps basically limit the amount of interest a payday

lender can charge on a given loan. In today's terms this usually means
that loans must not go over a certain APR. The idea to charge interest is
believed to have originated some time between 8000 and 5000 B.C.E.159
Historically, what constituted 'acceptable interest' was never really determined and therefore there was wide latitude for abuse - with some
lenders charging triple and even quadruple-digit levels of interest. u;o
Several early civilizations had instituted various interest ceilings in an
effort to curb exploitative lenders. 161 Most caps in these early societies
were around 30 per cent APR. 162 There are several examples of modemday interest caps as well. For instance, New South Wales (in Australia)
has implemented one for payday loans at 48 per cent APR. Also, the
United States has just passed legislation allowing for an interest rate cap
of 36 per cent APR for military personnel and their families. 163
Traditionally, interest rate caps were criticiz:ed as they were very
difficult to enforce and tended to significantly limit the amount of credit
available to unattractive borrowers. 164 Creditors argue that any interest
rate cap distorts the efficiency of the market. They justify charging
higher rates because of the high risk involved and the sunk costs associated with administering any loan, whether it is for $200 or $20,000.
"If the fee were limited to 35 per cent annually, lenders could only
charge$ 1.35 on a two-week loan for$ 100. This would not even pay for
a store employee to process the loan." 1 6.~ Lenders argue that ceilings
would not be profitable, and that this would shut out legitimate lenders.
As a result, those who would take advantage of payday lenders would
Supra, n. 17 at 808.
.so Ibid., at 833.

' 59
1

16 1

Christopher Peterson notes that a central element pertaining to interest caps that spans

across civilizations is the recognition that some loans cause more harm than good - and
that you could determine these loans based on price. Supra, n. 17 at 821. Jt is important to
note that in Canada interest rate caps on small Joans also have a Jong history that can be
traced to the 1939 Federal Small Loans Act. The Act was abolished in 1980 and the
criminal interest rate under s. 347 was introduced at the same time. See Jacob Ziegel, "Bill
C-44 Repeal of Small Loans Act and Enactme nt of New Usury Law" ( 1981) Canadian
Bar Review 188.
162

fbid.

Mann & Hawkins, supra, n. 145 at 871.
Peterson, supra, n. 17 at 825.
16
-' Aimee Minnich, "Rational Regulatmon of Payday Lending'" (2006) 16 Kan. J.L. & Pub.
Pol' y 84 at 92.
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have no choice but to seek more dangerous, less 'monitored' fonns of
loan acquisition. 166 Finally, lenders raise concerns that caps are not
effective as the only tool to employ, as they do not necessarily strike at
the heart of the problem associated with high-cost credit. 167 Instead, they
urge a more systemic and socioeconomic solution.
However, many commentators find fault in the arguments against
interest rate caps. For example, Pearl Chin questions the profitability
justification provided by lenders, since the increased deregulation and
exponential growth in the industry has not lead to lower loan prices. 168
As for decreasing availability of credit, both Keest and Drysdale argue
that this would not necessarily be such a bad thing. 169 These individuals
cannot afford the credit that they are getting from payday lenders in the
first place, and only dig themselves in a deeper hole by having access
to payday lenders. Keest and Drysdale also question whether a reduction
in alternatives is indeed the case, since according to a study by Uriah
King and Leslie Parrish, only 10 per cent of consumers had no other
alternative other than a payday loan. 110
Creditors are especially concerned with tying interest rate caps to
the APR, as this does not give an accurate picture of the price of the
loan. They analogize it as "stopping a taxi in Seattle and inquiring about
the fare to San Diego." 171 Lenders cite numerous publications they make
available to potential borrowers which clearly state that payday loans
should only be used as a source of short-term funds. However, the
American writing on predatory lending is awash with surveys and empirical data alleging that in reality the opposite is true- and that many
payday borrowers are borrowing for the long-tenn through the use of

166

Peterson, supra. n. 17 at 827.
Karen Gross, "Financial Literacy Education: Panacea, Palliative, or Something Worse?"
(200S) 24 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 307.
168
Pearl Chin, "Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation" (2004) U. Ill. L. Rev. 723
at 740.
,.. Lynn Drysdale&: Kathleen Keest, "'The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the
Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society" (2000) 51 S.C.L. Rev. 589 at 663-665.
170 Uriah King & Leslie Parrish. Springing the Debt Trap (Center for Responsible Lending:
167

2007) at 21.
111

Frequently Asked Questions, Webpage of Moneytree Lending Inc., <http://
www.moneytreeinc.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=page&sectionid=63> (accessed on
March 8, 2008).
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rollovers. 172 In fact, some go further and allege that the profit enjoyed
by payday lenders is actually dependent on these repeat borrowers. in

Creditors concerns notwithstanding, there is empirical evidence to
suggest that the use of interest rate caps can be a successful form of
consumer protection. King and Parrish conclude that stales which enforce a comprehensive interest rate cap at around 36 per cent (for small
loans) have "solved their debt trap problem." 174 In addition, they have
realized a savings of$1.5 billion for their citizens and "preserved a more
responsible small loan market." 175 Similarly, in a study conducted by
the Center for Credit and Consumer Law at Griffith University, interest
rates caps were seen as a blunt, but effective and easily enforceable tool
that could be used by regulators to prohibit extortionate credit. 176

(c) Education and Counselling
Financial literacy has become the latest buzzword to exemplify the
growing body of work signaling that most adults have not developed a
sophisticated appreciation of the substantial financial obligations that
they enter into. Due to this deficiency, the assumptions of contract
bargain theory often do not hold. Joseph Smith refers to three levels of
financial literacy. 177 The first is Financial Education and refers to the
teaching of general financial information, without reference to specific
goals of the individual. Overarching concepts include the consequences
of compound interest, the importance of saving and the pitfalls of paying
off debt with more debt. These principles could be taught at a relatively
early stage, perhaps while consumers were still in high school. The
second tier is known as Financial Training. 178 Financial Training refers
to the teaching of the practical financial skills necessary to achieve
particular goals. Applicants would have to complete programs on homeownership training before they embark on a major purchase such as
Canadian Payday Loan Association, "New Consumer Protection Pamphlet" (available in
March 2008 at Money Mart locations).
''' Johnson, supra, n. 2 at 69.
in

"' King & Parrish, supra, n. 170 at 4.
m Ibid.

,.,. Payday Lending in South Australia - Options to lncrtast Consumer Protection (Center
for Cred.it and Consumer Law, Griffith University: 2006) at 3.
m Joseph Smith, "Financial Literacy, Regulation and Consumer Welfare" (2004) 8 N.C.
Banking Inst. 77.
171

Ibid., at 83.
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buying their first home or car. 119 The capacity to calculate a car Joan, for
example, will provide them with the informed ability to shop around, or
to back out if their calculations produce a result they would not be able
to afford. The third and final tier is Financial Counselling. 180 Financial
Counselling refers to providing financial advice and training to a person
in financial distress. This would include individual, targeted counselling
that is responsive to specific behaviours and goals. Scott Schaaf notes
that Wisconsin requires consumer credit counselling for repeat payday
borrowers who "abuse" the system. 181 Currently financial counselling is
required as part of the consumer bankruptcy process in both Canada and
the United States. •112
Proponents advocate efforts that focus on financial literacy as they
not only minimize market distortion, but actually make them more efficient - since the actors would be behaving even mare rationally in
maximizing their own bargains. Furthermore education requires less
direct governmental influence, and is therefore not seen as paternalistic
as the other options. Smith notes, however, that the impact of these
different tiers is varied. iu The weakest impact occurs within the first
tier. Financial Counselling and Training were cited as much more effective. Smith highlights that while pre-transaction counselling is very
effective, post-transaction counselling can also be beneficial. 184
Others, such as Jean Braucher, argue that education can produce
important benefits, but only in the long-term and only ifstructural factors
are also modified She suggests that the traditional dichotomy between
structural and cultural factors should be abandoned, as structural changes
actually inform consumer culture. 185 Policies that are primarily used to
change consumer culture, therefore, will do linle to change habits when
pitted against strong structural causes of overindebtedness. She argues
that efforts to create a culture of personal financial responsibility requires
a systematic application and could easily take a generation or more to
'"Ibid.
100
Ibid., at 84.
111 Schaaf, supra, n. 24 at 352.
112 Bank"'ptcyand fnsolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985,c. 8 -3, s. 157. 1; 11U.S.C.§109(hXl)(West

2005).
Smith, supra, n. 177 at 98.
IM Jbid.
''° Jean Brauc her, "1beories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and Culture"
(2006) 7 Theoretical Inquires L. 323 at 325.
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take hold. 186 For example, initiatives intended to stimulate individual
savings must contend with strong marketing designed to stimulate credit
use.
In this vein, Laurie Burlingame advocates using the internet to
develop infonnation sources that would be responsible for collecting
infonnation about specific lenders. 187 She dismisses policies that rely
entirely on enhanced disclosure and consumer education, as many financial decisions are likely to be very difficult for most Americans to
fully absorb. Due to limits in cognitive capacity, consumers are left with
no choice but to filter out the majority of the infonnation they receive
and rely instead on rules ofthumb. 1118 Unfortunately this technique tends
to fail as consumers overestimate their ability to control events and
disregard low-level risk and probabilities of hann. They also feel pressure to close these transactions as soon as possible, as the decision is
taking up a significant amount of time, stress and resources.189
Other commentators are also not convinced that general education
is the most efficient use of resources to help fight against predatory
lending. For example, David Friedman argues that education and legislative schemes with broad targets actually preclude effective enforcement.190 Furthennore, consumer behaviour will not change overnight
with education initiatives. Instead consumer protection should target
certain groups and provide effective protection for them. By identifying
concentrated. less resource-intensive 'surgical' tactics, policymakers
will remove the many incentives of fraud perpetrators.191 In essence, if
policies were designed to actively monitor a selected population, lenders
would know there was a significant likelihood they would get caught.
Karen Gross criticizes the marketing of 'money education' as a tool
for "all that ails the consumercrediteconomy." 192 In her opinion it leads
to a 'blame the victim' type of mentality "by erroneously assuming that
1116
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individual knowledge acquisition alone will produce a fundamental
change in markets." 193 In fact, she argues that education serves to mask
more disturbing root causes of many of these financial problems. She
emphasizes the importance ofasset-building in low income communities
and eliminating misleading marketing messages that exploit infonnation
asymmetries. 194 Gross suggests changing the credit model to incorporate
different types of payment (such as making childcare payments or paying
rent to build credit history for excluded groups). 19s

6. REVISmNG THE CANADIAN REGULATORY SCHEME
Iain Ramsay, writing in 2000, produced the most wide-reaching
and significant Canadian report on access to credit in the alternative
consumer credit market. 196 The report applied key concepts and theories
underpinning consumer protection regulation more generally to various
markets that vulnerable consumers were turning to for credit. In writing
the report. he noted that there was little public knowledge in Canada of
the problems of low-income and marginalized consumers in obtaining
credit. 197 At the time there was little media interest in the issue and
middle-income consumers were profiting from their ownership of financial institutions that bought. and sold subprime loans. Payday loans
were unregulated.
Since 2000 much has changed. The payday lending industry in
Canada has grown significantly. Middle-income consumers have been
financially impacted by the subprime lending crisis in the United States
through their investment portfolios and stories of payday lending have
become common place in all arenas ranging from coffee shops to church
sennons to presidential campaign platforms. In addition, a number of
parallel provincial reform efforts are underway in Canada to regulate
payday lenders. The Canadian provinces have or are in the process of
implementing legislation that will make use of a combination of the
regulatory tools used by the various American regimes.
Canada, like other common law systems, uses its bankruptcy system as the primary form of regulation of overindebtness. Because con.., Ibid.
194 Ibid., at 309-310.
19' Ibid., at 31 ().311 .
,,... Ramsay, supra, n. 24.
197

Ibid.
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sumer bankruptcy is largely a middle-class phenomenon the law focuses
on that income group. Even though filing for bankruptcy costs several

thousand dollars, most of those considering bankruptcy can afford to
pay, drawing either upon their earnings or their friends and family. But
because bankruptcy law requires such significant out-of-pocket payments, bankruptcy is less accessible to poor debtors than to middle-class
debtors. 198 At the same time, the democratization of credit is well under
way in Canada, meaning that credit is increasingly available to lower
income debtors. 199
The regulation of payday loans holds the potential of extending the
benefits of regulating overindebtness, currently provided via bankruptcy
legislation to the middle-class, to lower income debtors. This potential
needs to be balanced against their needs and corresponding benefits
resulting from access to alternative credit markets, such as the payday
lending market. Situated in this context, the penultimate section of the
article evaluates the current reform efforts by drawing upon the American experience with the various regulatory tools the provinces are now
drawing upon as well as the visits to the six Toronto payday lenders.

(a) Disclosure
The provincial regulation requires disclosure in the form of posted
warnings and information in agreements about the cost of credit and the
high cost of the loans. Commentators reflecting on the American experience with disclosure as a tool for limiting predatory practices used by
payday lenders suggest that disclosure should be made in the form of
clear costs of borrowing rather than APR. That is, it should be clearly
stated that a loan will cost, for example, $20 for $100 borrowed for one
week, totaling $120 for one week. Any additional fees should also be
clearly noted. The total cost should be posted clearly at the front of the
store or on the counter in a similar fashion to the way that banks post
the daily exchange rate. In addition, the posted notice should clearly
indicate that these loans are intended to be short-term. The Ontario
legislation, like the other proposed and proclaimed provincial legislation?attempts to provide for this information1 however, as was evidenced
'"See: Stephanie Bcn-lshai & Saul Schwartz, "Bankruptcy for the Poor" (2007) 45(3)
Osgoodc Hall L.J. 471 and Stephanie Bcn-Ishai, ''The Gendered NatureofSocial Insurance
for the Non-Poor in Canada.. (2005) 4 3.3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 289.
100
Ben-lshai & Schwartz, ibid.
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by the on-site visits, the variation in the way that this infonnation was
provided made it difficult to understand and also difficult to compare
among stores.
Doubt is cast on the potential of disclosure as a regulatory tool by
the research on bounded rationality that suggests that consumers do not
always act in the rational way that underlies the rationale for disclosure.200 As is highlighted by the research on the American experience
with disclosure regulation, various other factors, such as convenience
and sunk search costs, may limit the utility of disclosure.wt On the other
hand, the provision of comparative price and tenn information by a
neutral third party has been put forward as the most effective fonn of
disclosure. 202 None of the current provincial regulatory schemes or proposals provide for this relatively low-cost measure.

(b)

Licensing

Licensing of payday lenders by third party provincially regulated
bodies holds the potential to address the issues surrounding the utility
of disclosure. In addition to serving a gatekeeping function, such bodies
are in a position to provide an effective form of information disclosure,
including comparative information. To assist customers with shopping
around prior to visiting a payday lender, licensees should be required to
provide daily reports of fees to the licensor, who should in tum make
these available to potential borrowers on the internet or through other
means. Further, on-site visits from provincial regulators may deter lenders from making oral representations that contradict posted disclosure,
disclosure in agreements, or provincial legislation. The on-site visits to
the Toronto payday lenders illustrate that large operators are violating
the self-regulatory standards they helped craft surrounding rollovers, for
example.
The funding for on-site visits would come from licensing costs paid
by the payday lenders. The challenge will be for the licensing body to
resist becoming "captured" by the payday lending industry. This concern
should be factored into decisions surrounding the appropriate licensing
framework. That is, whether the licensor should be within the provincial
200

Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at 30.

101
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consumer affairs ministry or a delegated administrative authority where
an arm's length agency administers the regime. The provinces where
there is a public utility commission or board appear to have delegated
authority to these semi-autonomous provincially regulated bodies. The
other provinces appear to have taken the former approach.
(c)

Rollovers

Each province that has put forward regulation has prohibited rollovers or charging an additional fee for a rollover. This prohibition is
also found in the industry's self-regulation. Given that rollovers are
clearly a regular practice associated with the business model for payday
lenders operating in Canada, and that the existing prohibition imposed
by payday lenders' self-regulatory body is ignored by lenders, a different
approach is necessary. It may be more reasonable to regulate the conditions for a rollover to take place and to require disclosure of not only
the cost of the loan but also the cost of a rollover. In addition, a cap may
be set on the number of times a rollover may be permitted and posted
warnings about the high cost of rollovers may be considered.

(d)

Enforcement

While class actions have entered the scene as an attempt to use the
judicial system to obtain a remedy for usurious interest rates charged by
payday lenders, the results remain to be seen. Class actions aside, most
low income borrowers will not have the resources to take action in court
against payday lenders. Accordingly, the most effective method for
enforcing the requirements in the new legislation is a simple vehicle for
complaint to the licensor that will result in non-recovery of the loan
amount by the lender. A number of the proposed or existing provincial
regimes merely provide that the interest will not be recoverable if the
legislation is violated. This is an insufficient form of deterrence; the
principle and interest should not be repayable. Detailed statistics should
be kept on all on-site visits, complaints, and resolutions.
(e)

Education and Counselling

In contrast to some American states, counselling has not been
adopted as part of the provincial regulatory models. While there has
been much criticism regarding the counselling requirement for bank-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ruptcy in Canada, it may be a helpful tool, when used in conjunction
with the other tools discussed, in this context. Potential borrowers should
be required to participate in a counselling session prior to taking a second
payday loan in a set period of time or attempting to rollover a payday
loan. Such sessions may be provided online for literate consumers or in
person and should be financed through the payday lenders, but provided
by the government through the licensing body or another delegated
authority. The counselling cost should not be passed on to potential
borrowers.
The main criticism leveled against counselling in the bankruptcy
context is that it adopts a "blame the victim" approach and focuses on
helping the debtor adopt better financial management practices. While
in some instances instruction on better budgeting practices may be helpful, often low income debtors will simply not have the money available
to budget with. It would be more useful to outline the borrower's rights
with respect to their outstanding payday loans. For example, the fact
that it is not cost effective for payday lenders to commence an action
against a borrower for an unpaid loan, may be helpful information to a
debtor contemplating her options. In addition, a detailed explanation of
the costs associated with rolling over a loan and exploration of other
possible sources of longer term credit may be helpful. .
Consideration should also be given to introducing some form of
financial education into the high school curriculum or even college and
university level curriculum. In addition, public education sessions financed by the licensing fees paid by payday lenders and held by licensors
would be helpful. The OPLEF provided for under the new Ontario
legislation provides a model for this approach. The implementation of
either form of education should not be used to justify limiting other
measures such as disclosure or interest rate caps.
(t)

Interest Rate Caps

As increased regulatory measures are imposed on payday lenders
they will undoubtedly argue that these measures will drive them out of
business. The democratization of credit that payday lenders have helped
facilitate is not in itself a bad thing and should not be treated as such.
The Quebec experience, where registration and a maximum interest cap
of 35 per cent are in place, and where there are no payday lenders

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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operating in the jurisdiction may be used to illustrate the impact that
regulatory decisions may have on the continued viability of the industry.
However, it is important to highlight that Credit Unions have played _a
much more prevalent role in the Quebec alternative credit market, and
accordingly, interest rate caps are not a complete explanation.203 Further,
the American experience suggests that payday lenders can adapt their
business model to a regulated lending environment with interest rate
caps. In implementing interest rate caps, it will be important to follow
Ramsay's line of reasoning, ..there is probably a convincing argument
that may be made for using interest rate ceilings as a method of protecting
against excessive rates but not as a means of second guessing market
rates.' 0204 Market rates in this context need to account for the current
practice of not performing credit checks or detailed assessments of
ability to pay prior to providing payday loans to borrowers in Canada.
Introducing such practices in this market will limit access to credit for
groups of borrowers that are otherwise excluded from accessing credit
and potentially push them into even more ex.pensive and unregulated
arenas.
To date, other than Quebec, only Manitoba has settled on an interest
rate cap. A formula that attaches both to the changing markets and limits
on excessive rates will need to be developed as the other provinces move
forward. Consultation on appropriate rates should not be limited to the
lenders or financial ex.perts, but should also include poverty experts and
payday loan consumers.
(g)

Provincial Harmonization

The Uniform Law Conference of Canada appears to have given
limited attention to the issue of payday lenders following the amendment
to the Criminal Code giving the provinces the ability to regulate in this

Ibid., at 37. Given that the Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over banking,
interests and negotiable insllUments. and the provinces over property and civil rights, there
may be a constitutional issue related to tne provinces setting interest rate caps. However,
as Mary Anne Waldron has concluded, "while the Federal government was given the
exclusive power to legislate on interest in the constitution, the provincial legislatures have
been permitted by the courts to can: out a significant and, perhaps widening sphere of
jurisdiction." M . Waldron, Tht I.Aw of Interest in Canada (Carswell: 1992) at 28, as cited
in Ramsay supra, n. 24 at 27.
2
°' Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at 32.
><>>
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The Consumer Measures Committee (CMC), a federal-provincial-territorial intergovernmental working group that seeks national approaches to consumer protection issues has also given the issue limited
consideration.206 Ontario's Ministry of Government Services Policy and
Consumer Protection Services Division indicates that its "preference is
for a harmonized national approach to regulation and interest rate setting,
with a federal lead on rate setti ng to create a national standard for the
industry." 207 However, to date an analysis and recommendations surrounding the harmonization of payday lending legislation has not been
provided and multiple provincial attempts at reform appear to be simultaneously proceeding without an attempt at national consultation. Ramsay provided a Model Act with his report in 2000, however, a harmonized
approach has not been adopted by the provinces. It continues to be true
that vulnerable consumers' interests and needs with respect to payday
lenders do not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so as to justify the
variation in existing and proposed legislation in this area continue,*
however, there remains no Canadian experience to justify choosing one
regulatory approach over another.
Ultimately an effort should be made to work towards a Model Act.
However, at this early stage in seeking to regulate a previously unregulated industry variation in provincial regulation may be a useful way
to assess the effectiveness of various approaches to regulating the industry. In addition, future work will need to consider the limits of
domestic regulation of payday lenders and the extent to which the internet and other technologies are facilitating payday lending across provincial and national borders.

7. CONCLUSION
This article has focused on assessing the evolving Canadian payday
lending regulatory framework as a discrete area of regulation of overindebtness of low income Canadians. A detailed assessment and comparison of the regulation of other forms of credit in the alternative credit
im

Babe, sup ra, n. 65.

Alternative Consumer Credit - Working Group" o nline: Consumer Measures Committee
< htcp://crocwcb.ca/epic/site/cmc-cmc .nsf/en/fe00025e.html >.
207 Consumer Protection in the Payday Lending Sector (April 27, 2007) online: < http://
www.gov.on.ca/mgslgraphics/ 126614.pdf>.
208 Ramsay. supra. n. 24 at 27.
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market was beyond the scope of the current project. The ability and the
willingness of the provinces to regulate payday loans following Bill C26 provide a unique opening. The development of ex-ante regulation
that will at the same time continue to grant low-income Canadians access
to credit through payday loans and protect them from predatory practices, provides an occasion to reflect on best practices for regulating
overindebtness of lower income Canadians. Up until this point, for the
most part, only middle-class Canadians had access to expansive regulation and relief from overindebtness through the bankruptcy regime.
While an increasing number of low-income Canadians now have access
to credit, they continue to have limited access to the bankruptcy regime.
Apart from measures aimed at increasing access to this ex-post remedy,
the current process of providing ex-ante relief is also promising. In order
to make this form of regulation meaningful lessons from the American
experience should be taken seriously and regulation that is helpful to the
actual consumers of payday loans should be carefully developed. An
ongoing effort should be undertaken to evaluate and compare provincial
efforts at regulation with a view to developing a domestic, and possibly
in the future, international model payday lending legislation.
The provincial reform efforts may contribute to the development
of a heightened sense of corporate social responsibility on the part of
payday lenders, which may in turn also facilitate a change in their lending
practices. As the payday lending industry expands in Canada, an increasing number of payday loans are offered by publicly traded corporations
that are accountable to an increasing number of shareholders and other
corporate stakeholders. Future research should consider the role of Canadian corporate and securities law in facilitating a change in the corporate governance practices of payday lenders. In addition, further research is necessary on the role of regulation and governance practices
in ensuring that mainstream financial institutions operate in a socially
responsible way in relation to lower income debtors.
Canadian banks, like their American counterparts, have been quite
reluctant to deal with low-income borrowers in a more direct fashion.
·They risk criticism if they reject too many customers, or charge higher
interests rates or use remedies such as foreclosure. 209 Therefore, there is

2<l9

He llwig, supra , n. 138 at 1:582; MacDonnell, supra, n . 32 at 49 .
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a tendency for larger financial institutions to just avoid an area, making
it very attractive to predatory lenders. This practice dates back to the
middle of the twentieth century when many American banks discrimi·
nated against certain racialized neighbourhoods through the practice of
redlining. 210 As a result, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) to mandate financial institutions "serve the convenience and
needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business".21 1
Federal examiners evaluate a bank's community reinvestment efforts
through three tests in lending, investments and service.212These ratings
are published for the public to review. The examiners can also deny
applications or place conditions on the approval of deposit facilities if
the CRA ratings are not adequate.213The CRA seeks to balance a bank's
benefits and burdens: banks that profit from community deposits should
be encouraged to extend credit to those same communities.m
The CRA provided some direction for the Canadian Department of
Finance's White Paper on "Reforming Canada's Financial Services Sector."m In that document, increased CRA-style disclosure was recommended, but it was noted that a full CRA regime is not warranted in
Canada, and that other mechanisms could be used to promote accountability.216 Instead of the CRA, the paper proposed that all financial
institutions with equity of over $1 billion disclose information on their
philanthropy, their employees' community service, and their efforts to
promote small businesses, micro-credit, and access to banking services.
Some of these recommendations were adopted in Bill C-8, An Act to
Establish the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada and to Amend
Certain Acts in Relation to Financial lnstitutions.2 17 The Act created the
110

211

Tiie term redlining originated from a lender's habit of outlining a specific 'poor neighbourhood' in red 10 indicate and exclude the area from lendi ng as it was too high risk.
Emily Berkman, "Microloans as a Community Reinvestment Act Compliance Strategy"
(2006) N.Y.U.J .L. & Bus. 329.

/bid.
Ibid.
2
" lbid.
"" Finance Canada, "Reforming Canada's Fi~ancial Services Sector: A Framework for tile
Future:· (Finance Canada, 1999).
212

213

216

211

/bid.
Bill C-8, An Act 10 Establish tht Financial Consunuir Agtncy of Canada and to Am#!nd
Certain Acts in Relation to Financial Tnstitwions. I st Scss.,37th Parl.. 2001 online: < http:/

/www2.parl.gc.ca/HouscPublications/Publication.aspx?Docld = 23310 I4&Language =e
&Mode= I> (assented to 14June 2001), 2001. c. 9.
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Financial Consumer Agency, responsible for making sure banks follow
through on their obligations under the Bill, and requires institutions with
equity of over $1 billion to publish an annual "Public Accountability
Statement" providing the information detailed above.218 However, critics
feel that this is still inadequate, as it does not provide information about
demand for financing, and whether the banks are appropriately meeting
the demand. 2 19 Nor does it produce regular data based on neighbourhood
(only by province), or by the characteristics of borrowers, unlike the
infonnation produced under the CRA.
The inquiries into whether Canada should move closer to the United
States in adopting CRA style legislation and the role that corporate
governance practices and regulation play in improving payday lending
practices are important research questions as Canada moves forward
with a regulatory scheme that takes into account the increasing democratization of credit.

rn Ibid., s. 3.
"Comparison of Amendments set out in Bill C-8 to Financial Institution and other Laws

m

vs. CCRC Recommendations" (200 I) online: CCRC < http://www.cancrc.orgfenglish/re
commOl.html > .
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dirccwr lhal 5l1lc k.nows
about Ille coosumcr
procection laws (s. 7.

required by die
Mini...,. (.. 37. 12t • ): licensee must
also provide boad
(s. 36. IS).

8); licensees must also

provide boods (s. 10).

May lpply lO
MiniSler for
liceDM; must pay

Need pemil 10
give payday
loaes. can set
pcnnil lluougb
regisnr and
must pay fees
(1 8C-D).

Each payday leader
(s. 6( I )). 11111 lolll
broker (•. 6(2)) i•

required IO hold a
license issued by lhe
Registrv. The

Regisuvcan
sUlpCllli or n:volu: a
1icmse in some cases
(s. 12). fJI selecled
~

lhe applicant

for a license (or a
renewal) is entided
'-'ing before
the License Appeal
tribunal (s. 13(7)).

lO I

Licenses are
required. need

~only
gnnt.ed

Liceueaare
required (s. 5-

• application
and fee 10 get
one (SS. 3-4 ).

10 lenden

6). aad '~nder
may be requinld

wbo chlrge
a maximum

IO provide a

bond or o«her
3S*' APR.
1bere are no financial
legal payday ""'wily (•- 7).
lenders in
Quet.ec.
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for-profit
orguizalion llW
operlleS • arm's
length from

..,........__

Coasullalion is
cuncnlly in

proams oo
licensing
rcq..m ......ia.

An applicalll for a
licmse (or ienewal)
must disclooe
changes in corponlC
coacrol and 8'ldl"5$
(s. 22( I)). The

Regillnr may• any
time rcqu.ire a
licensee IO provide
the Registrv with
c opies of~
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New Bnlllswick

Nova ScGcill

Oalariil

Priace F.dward Q.ebec

Sak.

blucl
thal the licensee uses
or proposes to ._ in
the course of

conducting business
(s. 47(2)) (all
sections pertain to
thePLA).
POIUd

Wanamp

Qucstioas

pertaining to a
disclosl.re regime
wasioch~in

the BC

Sign must say "Payday
Loans are High-Cost
Loans" and give the
cost in dollars for a
$300 loan (s. 16).

Consultation
P9per.

,,

ThiJ is in conjunction
with s. 156 [not yet
enacted].

' All lenders l!IU$I post
signs. The signs must
be posted promi11C11tly
and in ..:conlance with
the regulations, and
must clearly and
undcrsundably set Olli.
in the form required by
the regulalioos,
(a) all compooew of
the . - of credi~
includina all fees.
cbarges. penaltles,
interest and other
amounts and
CORlidc:ration for a
represetllalive payday
loan trusaclion: and

Payday lender must
post signs that
clwty set out full
cost of credit (s.
37.3).

Oovemot in

61.1(4)ofthc

Council can
make regulaliOllS
regarding the
display of fees.
chatges. rlleS
and prodll!ts
offered (I 8U(k)).

Con.s111Ur Prottction
Acr requires specific
discloslll'O on the
cost of borrowing.

MUSI post signs
1hat set Olli.
clearly and
proro.iDC11tly, all
componeats of
1lle cost of
credit. including
fees, charges.
interest, cu:. (s.
20).

NA.

M"" past sign
se1ting out costs
of all
COq>OMlll$ of

cost of credit (s.
21).
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(b) any ocbc.-

infortnllion requind by

~

the regulalions.
~

Borrower docsil't
have topeyoris
et1lilled to refund

for any lllOllCY
peid OVCI' !he

maximum sec; if
there is a rollo-.
bom>..... doesn't

~

°'

AnadminiSU'llli~

If there isa
vioi.tion of the
maximum cap on
be levied if there is •
cost of ciedit. then
vio!Mioa of lbc
the lcada mmt
muilllWll credit ctmae Rimbune or canDOI
penalty (of$ I 000.
$3000, or SSOO>) can

Regislra' can
inab leodcn

Rtgisttlr has tie

If the lenda

abilitytoref.,..

icimbune
borro-for

licenses, prohibit the
Ule of cenain

violates the cap,
lllUSI return 10

any expcDX3 IO

pnctioes, clcmand

~

adminiSCl'llli~ fines

tllll caanoc go o-

COSI of credit in

regulalioo (s.
24).

2

bom>wcr ror any

(12A); Uthe lou $10,000 (s. 59,

amount cllarged in
relation 10 the total
cost of ctedit of the

~mentsays

dcblor is llO< liable
for any amounts
relating to cost of
credit for pro-

existing Joan (s.
37.34).

bas IO repay

PLA).

loan (s. II); if

lender takes fees
for roll~.
1lle Director CID
must refund any
make orders fneziag amount charged
money or &$$dS of
there (s. 16).
pcnoo iovol V<ld in

principal and DOI proceedinp lbat
cost of credit
infringe upon the
(18P).

~

the maximum

charge the

152).

~

::io::

set by

reoewab (s. 19); 1lle

loan (37.31 (2){b); ir lltan maximum,
there's a rollover,
borrower only

refund all loan
c.t wges above

borrower all

or limits oa charges or

that borrower
muat n:pey more

Leedu must

comider·ation
gi~n to pay for

which laden
ll'ell 't enlitlcd

have to pey or is
lenda must reimlxne
ealilled to a refund bcJrrower for fees
of anything over
chorpd ova the
the principal or the maximum {s. 147 or
fust loan (112.10). Act) or for rolloven (s.

NA.

PLA. (s. 52, PLA).

With reprds to false
advc:.tising: the

~

(")

m
!""'

>

~

~

~

Direclor can also
order a CC$Salion

.

aodlor inandaiory

poblicalioit of.
e«reetion. (s. 53( I),
PLA).
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